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Abstract Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coher-
entists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham
considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justifica-
tion. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation
and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no
conjunction fallacy has been committed.
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0 Introduction
Tom Stoneham has presented an argument that, if correct, produces a reductio ad
absurdum of any coherence theory of justification (Stoneham 2007). Although Stone-
ham doubts that the argument can be correct, he confesses that he is unable to find
any error. In this contribution I surmise that the difficulty may well spring from a
confusion between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Experimen-
tal results in cognitive psychology have recently shown that many people actually
rely on assessments of confirmation when they are judging probabilities, and that this
might explain the apparent occurrence of a conjunction fallacy (Crupi et al. 2008). It
seems to me that Stoneham might have done the same thing: because he fails to distin-
guish between probability judgements and confirmation assessments, he mistakenly
thinks that a coherentist true to his colours must, under certain conditions, commit the
conjunction fallacy. In Sect. 1, I give a précis of Stoneham’s argument, attempting
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to stay as close as possible to Stoneham’s reasoning and notation. Then, in Sect. 2,
I explain how he may have gone astray.
1 A précis of Stoneham’s argument
Stoneham (2007, p. 2541) begins his argument with a description of coherentism:
(1) There are finite sets of beliefs such that each member of the set is epistemically
supported by some other member, and nothing else.
Then he develops a reductio of (1), culminating on the last page of his paper in its
negation:
(not-1) For any finite set of beliefs all of which have some positive degree of epi-
stemic support, at least one member of that set does not receive its support
entirely from the other members of the set.
Stoneham (p. 257) calls (not-1) “a pretty good definition of foundationalism”,
thereby implying that his reductio of coherentism may well serve as a proof of the
foundationalist’s stance.
The crucial term in (1) is ‘epistemic support’, which Stoneham (p. 254) defines as:
“A belief b(p) is epistemically supported by the belief b(q) iff b(p)’s justifiedness …
consists in part in b(p) standing in some relation of dependence to b(q).” – italics by
the author. The exact contents of the dependence relation is according to Stoneham
(ibid.) “a matter of debate between coherentists”.
Stoneham’s next step is to formulate a necessary condition of epistemic support:
(2) The relation of epistemic support is quasi-transitive.
Following a suggestion by Shackel (2008, p. 226), I have added the prefix ‘quasi’
to make clear that Stoneham wants to exclude any belief that epistemically supports
itself. In other words, if a belief in p supports a belief in q, and a belief in q supports a
belief in r, then a belief in p supports a belief in r only on condition that p = r. From
(1) and (2) Stoneham derives:
(3) The relation of epistemic support is not asymmetric.
Here is the derivation fully spelled out (p. 255):
From (1), b1 is supported by b2 and b1 = b2, b2 is supported by b3 and b2 =
b3, b3 is supported by b4 etc. Since the set is finite, for some i and j, bi = b j .
Without loss of generality suppose there are only three beliefs and b1 = b4. Then
b3 is supported by b1. Since b1 is supported by b2 and b2 is supported by b3, by
transitivity—… provided b1 = b3—b1 is supported by b3. So the relation is not
asymmetric.
Stoneham (ibid.) then derives (4) from (3):
1 All the references to Stoneham are to Stoneham (2007).
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(4) For some p and q and some thinker at some time, it is possible that the belief that
p&q is better supported [by a certain stock S of beliefs—JP] than the belief that
p or the belief that q alone.
Stoneham’s reasoning (ibid.) behind this derivation is as follows:
From (3) it is possible that there is a subject with stock of beliefs S such that
b(p) supports b(q) in the presence of S … and b(q) supports b(p) in the presence
of S …. Since, in the presence of S, b(p) supports b(q) and vice versa, S + b(p)
provides more support for b(q) than S alone and S + b(q) provides more support
for b(p) than S alone. Suppose a subject has S but not b(p) or b(q) and that S does
not support b(p) or b(q) or b(¬p) or b(¬q). Then if the subject adds just b(p)
or just b(q), he will be adding a belief with [less] support, but if he adds both he
will be adding a belief (viz. b(p&q)) with [more] support.2
Stoneham’s point may be illustrated by the epistemological situation of Mr. Cohen,
who has been a lifelong coherentist. Mr. Cohen has a stock of background beliefs, S,
and he is now entertaining two propositions, p and q, neither of which is contained in
S. After careful scrutiny, Cohen concludes that S does not really support either p or q:
the support imparted by S does not pass a particular threshold necessary for adding p
or q to S. For Stoneham this means that S is neutral with respect to both p and q; the
epistemic support that S gives to p is the same as the epistemic support that S gives to
∼p, and similarly for q and ∼q.3
However, Cohen notices that there is great mutual coherence between p and q.
Indeed, p and q can even be said to support one another in the following sense. If our
coherentist were to add p to S, the composite system p&S would support q more that
S alone, and in fact would pass the threshold. Similarly, if he were to add q to S, the
complex q&S would support p more than S alone, and the support would pass the
threshold. As Stoneham sees it, this fact makes it more reasonable for a coherentist to
add the conjunction p&q to his S than to add only p or only q. For although p or q might
not be very believable when taken separately, they display a great mutual coherence
(in the presence of S), for they both point in the same direction and jointly acquire a
plausibility that neither of them has alone.
Note that, until now, there has not been any mentioning of probability. And this
is no accident. As Stoneham has explained to me in private communication, he has
difficulties with any criticism that brings in probability at the beginning, because his
intention was to complete the argument on epistemic support before saying anything
about probability. The word ‘probability’ makes its first appearance when Stoneham
introduces his Axiom 5:
2 Stoneham’s text has: “Then if the subject adds just b(p) or just b(q), he will be adding a belief with no
support, but if he adds both he will be adding a belief (viz. b(p&q)) with positive support.” However, later
Stoneham states that the terms ‘no support’ and ‘positive support’ are only used to simplify the expression:
“the only assumption we really needed was that S + b(p) provides more support for b(q) than S alone and
S + b(q) provides more support for b(p) than S alone. And that must be the case for any S in the presence
of which b(p) supports b(q) and vice versa.”
3 Stoneham sets the degree of support in all these cases at 0.5, as he explained to me in private email com-
munication. So if the epistemic support, E, that S gives to q is neutral, then Stoneham writes E(q, S) = 0.5.
And if the epistemic support that S and p give to q is positive, he writes: E(q, S&p) > 0.5.
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(5) The belief that p epistemically supports the belief that q only if p raises the
probability of q.
From (4) and (5) it follows that the probability of p&q is greater than that of p or q:
(6) pr(p&q) > pr(p) or pr(p&q) > pr(q),
which is the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham (p. 255) reasons:
These probabilities are credences. Suppose our subject has belief set S and comes
to consider p and q, then the credence of p is 0.5 but the credence of p&q is >0.5.
The final conclusion then is that Mr. Cohen and his fellow-coherentists are commit-
ted to a notion of epistemic support that violates the probability calculus. Stoneham
regards this as a reductio of coherentism.
2 Where is the flaw?
Although Stoneham believes that his argument is incorrect, he states that he is unable
to find the flaw. He argues that the flaw cannot lie in (1), for (1) is “characteristic
for [the coherentist’s] view” (p. 256). The transitivity condition (2) is “pretty much
analytic” (ibid.), and premise (3) was correctly derived from (1) and (2). Premise (4)
cannot be the culprit either, since it has been correctly inferred from (3). That leaves
us with (5), about which Stoneham (p. 256) writes:
(5) might be a matter of debate, but it is hard to see how there could be counter-
examples …. How can p give us any reason to believe q is true if the truth of p
does not make q any more likely?
However, I think that (5) is a clear illustration of the flaw in Stoneham’s argument.
In order to see that, we must first realise that Stoneham’s notion of epistemic sup-
port has all the characteristics of a measure of confirmation. The two constraints that
Stoneham imposes on epistemic support, namely that it is quasi-transitive and not
asymmetric, are also properties of confirmation. There exist many different measures
of confirmation (for overviews see Fitelson 1999; Crupi et al. 2007). All of these mea-
sures are not asymmetric, and Shogenji (2003) has shown that they are also consistent
with transitivity.4 But no matter how natural and intuitive it is to interpret Stoneham’s
‘p epistemically supports q’ as ‘p confirms q’, none of the people that reacted to
Stoneham seem to have noticed it. This goes equally for Stoneham’s critics
(Noordhof 2007; Jäger 2007; Rowbottom 2007) as for his defender (Shackel 2008);
indeed, I myself at first overlooked it.
The most simple and popular degree of confirmation is Carnap’s measure D, which
is the conditional probability of p, given S, minus the unconditional probability of p:
D (p, S) = pr (p|S) − pr (p),
4 All the common measures of confirmation share the property that, if p confirms q, then q confirms p,
although not in general to the same degree. So all confirmation measures are not asymmetric. Transitiv-
ity of confirmation, as of probabilistic support, is not in general true, but under the ‘nearest neighbour
screening-off’ restriction it is so (Shogenji 2003). So confirmation measures can be transitive.
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In the rest of this paper I shall define Stoneham’s notion of epistemic support in terms
of D. However, no strings are attached to that: everything I say would apply if I were to
define ‘confirmation’ with any other of the existing Bayesian confirmation measures.
Once we have defined ‘confirmation’ in this way, we can see that axiom (5) is
ambiguous: it has two interpretations. The first interpretation is given in (5a):
If D (q, p&S) > D(q, S) then pr (q|p&S) > pr(q|S).5 (5a)
The other one is (5b):
If D (p&q, S) > D (q, S) then pr (p&q|S) > pr (q|S) . (5b)
Interpretation (5a) sits badly with at least two important passages in Stoneham’s
text. First, it does not sit well with Stoneham’s claim that, for a coherentist, adding a
conjunction to his stock of beliefs can be more rational than adding only one of the
conjuncts. Stoneham’s reason for this claim is, as we have seen, that a conjunction can
be better supported than one of the conjuncts. However, in (5a) there is no question of a
conjunction being supported. The conjunction appearing in (5a) gives support, it does
not receive it. Second, (5a) is at odds with the fact that Stoneham’s calls (5) an axiom.
For (5a) is not an axiom, it is a definition of epistemic support. As such it goes both
ways: not only is it the case that, if D(q, p&S) > D(q, S) then pr(q|p&S) > pr(q|S),
but it is also the case that, if pr(q|p&S) > pr(q|S), then D(q, p&S) > D(q, S).
So Stoneham must have meant interpretation (5b). But while (5a) is a logical truth,
(5b) is a logical falsehood; its consequent is always false. Stoneham’s rhetorical ques-
tion “How can p give us any reason to believe q is true if the truth of p does not make
q any more likely?” can now be answered: p can be a reason to believe q if it raises
the degree of confirmation of q, even though it does not increase the probability of q.
As we have seen, Stoneham finds it “hard to see how there could be counter-exam-
ples” to (5). Let me therefore conclude by presenting a counterexample to (5b).6
Consider the three propositions
p = Bobby is a girl
q = Billy is a girl
S = Bobby and Billy are twins,
then the antecedent of (5b) is true but its consequent is false.
The names ‘Bobby’ and ‘Billy’ can be used for boys as well as for girls. Since we
do not know whether Bobby and Billy are in fact boys or girls, and since the statement
that they are twins (S) does not affect the probability of their being boys or girls, it is
the case that:
5 The reason for translating the antecedent of (5), i.e. ‘The belief that p epistemically supports the belief
that q’, into the antecedent of (5a) and thus into a comparison of two epistemic supports, is that I wanted to
stay close to Stoneham’s notation – see note 3. I thank Tomoji Shogenji for making this point.
6 Thanks to David Atkinson for help with constructing this counterexample.
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pr (p) = pr (q) = pr (p|S) = pr (q|S) = 1/2
pr (¬p) = pr (¬q) = pr (¬p|S) = pr (¬q|S) = 1/2,
which precisely reflects Stoneham’s assumption that S is neutral with respect to p or
q. Further, since p and q are independent, it follows that
pr (p&q) = 1/2 × 1/2 = 1/4.
However, 8% of all twins are monozygotic (so-called identical twins), and these are
always of the same sex. Thus the information that Bobby and Billy are twins slightly
increases the probability that they are of the same sex, and slightly decreases the prob-
ability that they are of different sexes. Hence the probability that Bobby and Billy are
both girls, given that they are twins, is slightly more than a quarter:
pr (p&q|S) = 1/4 + ε
where we can in fact calculate ε = 0.02. So the probability that Billy and Bobby are
both girls is 0.27 (as is the probability that they are both boys). Note that pr(p&q|S)
is quite a lot less than pr(p|S) or pr(q|S), so there is no question of a conjunction
fallacy:
pr (p&q|S) < pr (q|S) or pr (p|S) .
Nevertheless, D(p&q, S) is greater than D(p, S) or D(q, S). For
D (p&q, S) = pr (p&q|S) − pr (p&q)
= 1/4 + ε − 1/4 = ε
whereas
D (p, S) = pr (p|S) − pr (p) = 1/2 − 1/2 = 0
D (q, S) = pr (q|S) − pr (q) = 1/2 − 1/2 = 0.
So
D (p&q, S) > D (q, S) or D (p, S) .
Thus we have an example in which the conjunction p&q has a smaller probability but
a greater confirmation than either p or q has separately—everything conditioned by
S. With the eminently reasonable identification of epistemic support as a measure of
confirmation, I conclude that no violation of the probability calculus has occurred.
What Stoneham sees as a probabilistic conjunction fallacy that is fatal to coherentism
is in fact a perfectly legitimate conjunction effect for degrees of confirmation.
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